1. US alliances are popular

• A record 58 per cent of Americans say their alliance with Australia makes the United States more secure, a significant increase from 44 per cent in December 2021.

• A similar 63 per cent of Australians and 57 per cent of Japanese respondents say their US alliance makes their nation more secure, while only 12 per cent in Australia and eight per cent in Japan say their US alliance makes them less secure.

• Nearly half of Australian and Japanese respondents want the same or increased numbers of US troops in their respective countries with 27 per cent of Australians and five per cent of Japanese respondents wanting US troop numbers in their nations to increase.

• But, at the same time, Americans want their allies to do more — 70 per cent said “making US allies pay more for security assistance” is somewhat to very important.

• And Australians and Japanese publics want to be able to operate independently — 76 per cent of Australians and 58 per cent of Japanese respondents say developing a foreign policy that was independent of global powers was somewhat to very important.

2. Negative views of China have solidified across the region

• America’s negative sentiment toward China remains bipartisan and unchanged from 2021 but also closely mirrors sentiment among America’s closest Asian allies — Australia and Japan.

• Between 52 to 55 per cent of American, Australian and Japanese respondents say China is more harmful than helpful in Asia compared with 28 per cent of Australians and seven per cent of Japanese respondents who say the United States is more harmful in Asia.

• Pluralities of the Australian and Japanese respondents do not want the United States to soften its approach to China with only 20 per cent of Australians and 12 per cent of Japanese respondents saying the US handling of China is too aggressive.

• In terms of their own countries’ response to China, Australian respondents stood out for being more likely to approve their country’s handling of China (36 per cent), indicating significantly more self-approval than the Japanese and US publics where more respondents disapprove than approve of their government’s handling of China.

• Australian predictions from 2017 that China’s influence already has and will continue to eclipse all others in Asia remain largely unchanged in 2022, yet Japanese respondents continue to see a more distributed balance of power in the region’s future.

3. US, Australian and Japanese publics favour robust responses to Chinese aggression but prioritise diplomatic and economic approaches

• Respondents in all three nations express more willingness than not when it comes to sending military forces in the event of a crisis in Taiwan, with nearly half of Australians willing to send military forces to help the United States defend Taiwan.

• At the same time, majorities in all three nations prefer the use of non-military alternatives in such a scenario, specifically economically isolating China and, in the case of Australian and American respondents, sending Taiwan weapons — a mirroring of the international response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

• Should China end up building a military base in the Solomon Islands, majorities of US, Australian and Japanese respondents prefer a positive approach with increased diplomacy in the region and offering the Solomon Islands a better economic deal than China rather than punishing the Solomon Islands economically or using military force against the base.

4. Americans want trade agreements with Asia and share a scepticism of economic ties with China

• Half of Americans think the United States should join trade agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership while the other half are split between those against joining and those who are unsure about it.

• Only 17 per cent of Americans (and 23 per cent of Trump voters) said increasing trade and investment in Asia was not important at all.

• US, Australian and Japanese consumers are willing to pay the costs of economic decoupling from China despite record levels of inflation, with 72 per cent of Americans willing to buy additional amounts of Australian products currently blocked by China and 70 per cent of Americans and Australians willing to pay at least $500 more for a phone not made in China. Japanese respondents track with these views.

5. All three publics want to broaden the alliance agenda

• Trilateral support for the new AUKUS security partnership, particularly in the United States and Australia, dramatically outweighs criticism, with about half of US and Australian respondents and 28 per cent of Japanese respondents in favour of Australia having nuclear-powered submarines while only 18-19 per cent of respondents in the three countries were against it.

• This support complements the 70 per cent or more of the US, Australian and Japanese publics who want to see, or think it is important to have greater collaboration with their allies on issues around climate change and emerging technologies.

• Only three to six per cent of respondents in all countries express any reservations about collaborating with each other to develop emerging technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computers and semiconductor manufacturing.

• In terms of American preferences between allies to work collaboratively on these emerging technologies issues, 72 per cent of Americans support collaborating with Australia and 61 per cent support collaborating with Japan.

6. Americans, and their allies to a lesser extent, are concerned about US democracy

• Two-thirds or more of Americans are very concerned about Congress’ ability to do its job (71 per cent), misinformation (70 per cent) and the way their democracy is working (64 per cent).

• Half of Americans are concerned about the potential for political violence, yet those who voted for Joe Biden in 2020 are nearly twice as likely (64 per cent) to be very concerned about it as those who voted for Donald Trump (34 per cent).

• Approximately half or more of Australians are very concerned about American democracy, misinformation, and political violence. The level of those very concerned in Japan about such issues in the United States is 25-30 percentage points lower than in Australia, with the plurality of Japanese respondents only somewhat concerned.

• Looking ahead to 2024, 19 per cent of Australians and 14 per cent of Japanese respondents said a second Biden term of office would be bad for their country while 50 per cent of Australians and 41 per cent of Japanese respondents said a second Trump term of office would be bad for them.1. Negative views of Beijing persist across all three countries, but fewer Australians see war with China as likely

• Fewer Australians see conflict with China as likely; less than half of Australians say war with China is somewhat or very likely, down from 59 per cent in 2022.

• Twice as many Japanese respondents (40 per cent) than Americans (19 per cent) say war with China is very unlikely for their country in the next 10 years.

• A majority of respondents believe that Chinese dominance in Asia would be bad for their countries. More than two-thirds (67 per cent) of Japanese respondents say that China being the most influential country in Asia would be bad for their country, followed by 57 per cent of Australians and 51 per cent of Americans.

• All three countries show a clear perception that China, not the United States, will be the most economically and militarily influential country in Asia. Yet, US allies remain noticeably more optimistic about US influence in Asia than Americans themselves.

2. While US alliances remain important to all three publics, American and Australian publics are slightly less positive about them than last year

• A majority of Australian (54 per cent) and Japanese (55 per cent) respondents continue to believe their US alliance makes them safer, albeit fewer Australians than last year (63 per cent).

• Half or more of Americans think US alliances with Australia (53 per cent), Japan (52 per cent), and NATO (54 per cent) make the United States more secure — slightly fewer than in 2022, but still well above 2021 levels.

• Japanese respondents (55 per cent) are nearly twice as positive about the helpfulness of the United States in Asia than Australians (29 per cent), outpacing even Americans’ self-perception (39 per cent). However, scepticism about the US role in Asia is more pronounced among 18–34 year old Americans and Australians.

• A plurality of Australian (36 per cent) and Japanese respondents (35 per cent) support US handling of China, though Americans (20 per cent) are less positive about their own country’s handling of China.

3. Australian, American and Japanese publics continue to favour robust responses to Chinese aggression

• Half of Australians support following the United States into armed conflict if a US ally like Japan is attacked — more than twice the percentage of Japanese respondents (24 per cent) who say they agree with following the United States into conflict if a US ally like Australia is attacked.

• While Australian (46 per cent) and American (35 per cent) respondents express more willingness than not when it comes to sending military forces in the event of a crisis in Taiwan, Japanese respondents (26 per cent) appear less eager.

• Australians and Japanese respondents see a different role for the United States in their security. Australian respondents (46 per cent) are twice as likely as Japanese respondents (19 per cent) to support basing US marines in their own state, and are more receptive to an independent foreign policy (60 per cent of Australians agree versus 36 per cent of Japanese).

• Minorities in all three countries agree with introducing additional taxes to make their countries’ militaries more competitive with China’s military — 36 per cent of Australians, 37 per cent of Americans and just 24 per cent of Japanese respondents.

• While strong majorities in all countries want to collaborate on non-traditional security issues, Australians (84 per cent) are keener than Japanese respondents (63 per cent) to hold China to account on human rights.

4. AUKUS is broadly supported by all three publics, particularly in Australia — even if Australians believe it will lock them into supporting the United States in a conflict

• All three publics think the AUKUS partnership makes Asia safer. For Australians, a plurality of 43 per cent think it makes the region safer.

• While a third or more of American (32 per cent) and Japanese respondents (38 per cent) say they don’t know whether AUKUS makes Asia safer, over five times as many Americans and Japanese respondents agree that it makes Asia safer than those that disagree.

• Only small minorities (14–19 per cent) in all three nations think it is a bad idea for Australia to have nuclear-powered submarines.

• Some 60 per cent of Australians see AUKUS as a good idea that will create jobs.

• Despite such support, nearly half of Australians think AUKUS will lock Australia into supporting the United States in a conflict, with just 10 per cent disagreeing.

5. Despite a year of turmoil in Washington, views of US political dysfunction remain largely unchanged while the impact of the US 2024 election on Asian alliances may be less significant than anticipated

• Americans and, to a lesser extent, their allies remain very concerned about the state of US politics, but no more notably concerned than before the 2022 midterm elections.

• Australians hold more negative opinions (45 per cent) on a second Trump term than Japanese
  respondents (40 per cent), but both publics are increasingly unbothered by a second term for either leading candidate.

• Japanese publics believe their alliances with the United States should continue irrespective of who wins office in 2024, while Australians are more divided on the question though still more likely to want to maintain their alliance regardless of the 2024 outcome.