public opinion research

one year to the 2024 us presidential election: the stakes for Australia and the alliance

Published 1 November 2023 by United States Studies Centre

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In August 2023, the United States Studies Centre conducted a public opinion survey in Australia, the United States and Japan to understand the public sentiment in each nation on a variety of issues one year out from the 2024 US presidential election.

Since the previous iteration of polling by the United States Studies Centre (USSC) in October 2022, uncertainty about Beijing’s intentions continued with growing tensions over Taiwan; Australia’s Defence Strategic Review delivered a bleak assessment of the nation’s military preparedness and shortened warning time before a major conflict; Australia and Japan committed to the greatest levels of investment in their respective defences since the Second World War; the US Congress increased its focus on the region with the formation of a new select committee on China; and the business community quietly embraced “de-risking” in the face of new export control rules by Washington and increased political pressure on investors within China. The level of unease was only exacerbated by US political discord, with the 2022 US midterm elections delivering one of the tightest-ever House majorities by the Republican Party; the historic first-ever ousting of a US House Speaker; a criminal mugshot from a former president; two near encounters with congressional fiscal cliffs; and highly politicised investigations into the two leading candidates for the presidential election next year.

USSC polling in 2023 reveals continued support for the alliance agenda.

With just over a year remaining before the 2024 US presidential election, one might expect from these trends a deepening public pessimism about US alliances in Australia and Japan. Yet, USSC polling in 2023 reveals a strikingly positive picture about the future for cooperation and partnership between the United States and its allies.

While Australian, American and Japanese respondents see China as both harmful to Asia as well as the region’s future economic and military leader, they are not expecting a war. Indeed, compared to 2022, fewer Australians see war with China as a likely outcome. Undoubtedly contributing to that confidence in peace is the fact that majorities in all three countries continue to say their alliances make them safer. But the three publics also make clear that they do not want these alliances to stand idly, with large majorities signalling a strong appetite for closer cooperation across a range of security initiatives from the AUKUS partnership to supporting Taiwan in a contingency and assisting democratic elections in Asia.

Perhaps most surprisingly in the aftermath of continued US political dramas, Australian and Japanese concerns about American democracy, the ability of congress and the president to do their jobs and political violence remain largely unchanged, and are even slightly decreased from 2022. Furthermore, just one year away from the presidential election, both Australians and Japanese respondents remain supportive of their alliances with the United States even if their preferred 2024 candidate is unsuccessful and a more unpopular president reclaims the Oval Office. US politics may be cacophonous, but it does not appear to be a deal breaker for US allies in Asia.

This report ultimately finds that public support and ambition for cooperation between Canberra, Washington and Tokyo is strong. The question is whether it is strong enough to weather the challenges ahead.

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KEY FINDINGS

1. Negative views of Beijing persist across all three countries, but fewer Australians see war with China as likely

Fewer Australians see conflict with China as likely; less than half of Australians say war with China is somewhat or very likely, down from 59 per cent in 2022.
Twice as many Japanese respondents (40 per cent) than Americans (19 per cent) say war with China is very unlikely for their country in the next 10 years.
A majority of respondents believe that Chinese dominance in Asia would be bad for their countries. More than two-thirds (67 per cent) of Japanese respondents say that China being the most influential country in Asia would be bad for their country, followed by 57 per cent of Australians and 51 per cent of Americans.
All three countries show a clear perception that China, not the United States, will be the most economically and militarily influential country in Asia. Yet, US allies remain noticeably more optimistic about US influence in Asia than Americans themselves.

2. While US alliances remain important to all three publics, American and Australian publics are slightly less positive about them than last year

A majority of Australian (54 per cent) and Japanese (55 per cent) respondents continue to believe their US alliance makes them safer, albeit fewer Australians than last year (63 per cent).
Half or more of Americans think US alliances with Australia (53 per cent), Japan (52 per cent), and NATO (54 per cent) make the United States more secure — slightly fewer than in 2022, but still well above 2021 levels.
Japanese respondents (55 per cent) are nearly twice as positive about the helpfulness of the United States in Asia than Australians (29 per cent), outpacing even Americans’ self-perception (39 per cent). However, scepticism about the US role in Asia is more pronounced among 18–34 year old Americans and Australians.
A plurality of Australian (36 per cent) and Japanese respondents (35 per cent) support US handling of China, though Americans (20 per cent) are less positive about their own country’s handling of China.

3. Australian, American and Japanese publics continue to favour robust responses to Chinese aggression

Half of Australians support following the United States into armed conflict if a US ally like Japan is attacked — more than twice the percentage of Japanese respondents (24 per cent) who say they agree with following the United States into conflict if a US ally like Australia is attacked.
While Australian (46 per cent) and American (35 per cent) respondents express more willingness than not when it comes to sending military forces in the event of a crisis in Taiwan, Japanese respondents (26 per cent) appear less eager.
Australians and Japanese respondents see a different role for the United States in their security. Australian respondents (46 per cent) are twice as likely as Japanese respondents (19 per cent) to support basing US marines in their own state, and are more receptive to an independent foreign policy (60 per cent of Australians agree versus 36 per cent of Japanese).
Minorities in all three countries agree with introducing additional taxes to make their countries’ militaries more competitive with China’s military — 36 per cent of Australians, 37 per cent of Americans and just 24 per cent of Japanese respondents.
While strong majorities in all countries want to collaborate on non-traditional security issues, Australians (84 per cent) are keener than Japanese respondents (63 per cent) to hold China to account on human rights.

4. AUKUS is broadly supported by all three publics, particularly in Australia — even if Australians believe it will lock them into supporting the United States in a conflict

All three publics think the AUKUS partnership makes Asia safer. For Australians, a plurality of 43 per cent think it makes the region safer.
While a third or more of American (32 per cent) and Japanese respondents (38 per cent) say they don’t know whether AUKUS makes Asia safer, over five times as many Americans and Japanese respondents agree that it makes Asia safer than those that disagree.
Only small minorities (14–19 per cent) in all three nations think it is a bad idea for Australia to have nuclear-powered submarines.
Some 60 per cent of Australians see AUKUS as a good idea that will create jobs.
Despite such support, nearly half of Australians think AUKUS will lock Australia into supporting the United States in a conflict, with just 10 per cent disagreeing.

5. Despite a year of turmoil in Washington, views of US political dysfunction remain largely unchanged while the impact of the US 2024 election on Asian alliances may be less significant than anticipated

Americans and, to a lesser extent, their allies remain very concerned about the state of US politics, but no more notably concerned than before the 2022 midterm elections.
Australians hold more negative opinions (45 per cent) on a second Trump term than Japanese
respondents (40 per cent), but both publics are increasingly unbothered by a second term for either leading candidate.
Japanese publics believe their alliances with the United States should continue irrespective of who wins office in 2024, while Australians are more divided on the question though still more likely to want to maintain their alliance regardless of the 2024 outcome.

METHDOLOGY

Unless indicated otherwise, the polling data used in this report was derived from surveys conducted between 15 and 25 August 2023. These surveys were conducted by YouGov, a global public opinion and survey company, which fielded representative samples drawn from Australia, the United States and Japan. The surveys were administered online to adult, citizen populations with sample sizes of 1,019 in Australia, 1,055 in the United States and 1,015 in Japan. These surveys build on previous USSC surveys of representative US and Australian samples in September 2022, December 2021, February 2021, October 2020 and July 2019 and collaborative polling projects with the Asian Research Network in March 2017. Question wording was kept as consistent as possible to permit valid inferences about trends and changes over time.

The maximum margin of error is approximately 3.1 per cent for the entire sample of respondents in each country. This is the 95 per cent confidence interval for a 50 per cent proportion. It is larger for the subsets of population (for instance, by vote and age). Figures 2, 11, 13, 17, 22, 23, 24 and 25 in this report polled a 50 per cent sample for each population.

MEDIA

About the United States Studies Centre

The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is a university-based research centre, dedicated to the rigorous analysis of American foreign policy, economic security, emerging technology, politics and culture.